By Paul DeHart, Jul 7, 2009 in Musings
I noted in an earlier post that the Enlightenment (inasmuch as we can speak of one rather than several mutually exclusive enlightenments) justified itself in light of a narrative demonstrably false at many crucial points. In several disciplines—most notably in analytic Western philosophy and in post-Bultmannian theology—it has become apparent that the Enlightenment is dead. C. S. Lewis described the death of Enlightenment naturalism as the funeral of a great myth. His seminal essay still repays reading. In a number of disciplines, the Enlightenment reached its culmination in logical and scientific positivism as well as in the fact-value dichotomy. The instrumentalization of reason was also a foundational program of the Enlightenment. These foundational programs of the Enlightenment have died. In particular, the empericist and positivistic claim that we can only predicate truth of that which is empirically verifiable is not itself empirically verifiable. But it was the requirement of empirical verifiability that moved theology out of the realm of "science" and that grounded the prohibition on invoking premises of faith when practicing political philosophy or when assessing the truth of conclusions reached by political theorists, philosophers, and theologians from ages past. It is the empirical verifiability requirement that undergirded (at least by entailment though sometimes by express invocation—especially in those less guarded moments on panels) the new historicists' claim that there are no "eternal verities" (their term) and that it is nothing but violence to context to claim that a given theorist ever uttered anything transcendent of its time and place. Of course, the denial of eternal verities is manifestly the affirmation of one "eternal verity" and so is self-referentially incoherent. Moreover, as I alluded above, positivism's empirical verifiability requirement is, because it cannot be empirically verified, also self-referentially incoherent. And, as Al Plantinga rightly notes in Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford Press), positivism (at least of the logical and scientific sort) has "thankfully" been swept into the dustbin of history. But we have not yet adequately appropriated the fall of positivism into the study of the history of political thought or into political theory. The implications of the fall of positivism for political theory include (but is not limited to) the elimination of the logical ground for the prohibition against invoking and reasoning to or from premises drawn from religious faith in the practice of political philosophy. That is, the fall of logical and scientific positivism means that political theorists are not wrong if they want to study thinkers of the past in pursuit of truths necessary or contingent, eternal or temporal. Indeed, the fall of positivism means that it is wrong to assume that any given work of political philosophy is explicable just by an account of the context in which it was written. To say otherwise is to commit the genetic fallacy to the highest degree. Political theorists will be, as most have ever been, concerned with context. Many will view historical context as a necessary condition for understanding a given work of political theory. But necessary conditions are not sufficient conditions. From the claim that understanding the context in which a work of political thought is written is necessary for understanding a given work of political theory, it does not (for it logically cannot) follow that understanding the context in which a work was written is sufficient for understanding that work. The Englightenment's end means that we can think clearly again about the a priori possibility that a thinker informed by his time and place might nevertheless transcend it. But to return to my main point, the end of the Enlightenment spells the end for the Rawlsian, Straussian, and historicist insistence that premises drawn from religious faith NOT be brought into the practice of political theory—whether interpretive or constructive. The corollary should be quite obvious—persons of faith practicing political philosophy and studying the history of political thought can bring such premises to bear. Just how awaits exploration. I might only add that drawing premises from faith—that is, taking religious premises plausible as truth claims rather than as merely contextual—is at least sometimes what taking the context seriously requires.
5 Responses to "Doing Political Philosophy after the Enlightenment's End"
Lee Trepanier on Jul 11, 2009
If I understand you correctly, the collapse of positivism as the Enlightenment's methodology to study reality allows a space for religious faith to be incorporated (or re-incorporated) into a new methodology to study reality. If I am correct in understanding your argument (and if I am wrong, please correct me), I would like to make two points:
1. Is the Enlightenment really over? I know the advent of postmodernity have made some claim that the Enlightenment is over, but isn't postmodernity just an extension of the Enlightenment project?
2. Eric Voegelin's "new science" would seem to be a methodology that incorporates religious experience into the philosopher's study of reality. This doesn't necessarily make such a methodology superior to say Strauss' or Rawls'. It would seem to you would have to make the case why such an (re)incorporation of religious experience into a study of reality is necessary.
Paul DeHart on Jul 12, 2009
Great questions from Lee; which is to say, they are precisely to the point. As with all unworthy responses, let me reverse the order and begin with the second question and then take a stab at the second part of the first question. I'll post a reply to the first part of the first question separately after that.
As to the second question . . . I did not mean, for the time, to advocate the superiority of a "new science." I only meant to argue that social scientists and philosophers (and perhaps even scientists) who want to invoke premises drawn from religious faith (or who want to argue to premises of faith from the data at hand) deserve a place at the table. I meant to argue that the ground for denying a Christian political theorist (as such) a place at the table in mainstream academic circles has fallen (and irreparably so). Nor would I want to be construed as advancing an argument on behalf of Voegelin's project. I respect Voegelin. But as an orthodox Christian I find myself compelled to reject what I take to be Voegelin's account of the incarnation and its relation to the transcendent. To the extent that I would advance a different science of politics, it would be an Augustinian-Thomistic science and so not new in any meaningful sense. Whether or not such a science is superior to the political philosophies of Strauss or Raws depends, I suppose, on whether or not one embraces the antecedent to a conditional: If the divine exists, then a science that takes it into account is, all other things equal, superior to a science that does not. While I accept the conditional and affirm the antecedent, I wouldn't have meant my comments above to turn on whether or not one did. To be redundant, I was only arguing there against Straussian, Rawlsian, and historicist premises that preclude questions and premises drawn from religious faith. I hope one who rejected the antecedent to the conditional just framed or even the conditional itself, might nevertheless find themselves able to agree with the argument above--chiefly because it turns on self-referential difficulties with the ban on invoking premises drawn fro religious faith, whether advanced by a Straussian, Rawlsian, or a historicist. The self-referential problems obtain whether or not one subscribes to or would refrain from subscribing to a "new" or different science of politics that was premised on the reality of the transcendent or that was based on a methodology that allowed or searched for that reality.
As to the second part of the first question, Lee sees what many do not. And I would affirm, wholeheartedly, that postmodernity, under a certain meaning, is in fact naught else but an extension of the Enlightenment. In fact, I frequently describe what many mean by "postmodernity" is really just modernity on steroids. It's modern premises taken to their logical conclusions and shorn of any pre-modern attachments. Thus Lyotard frequently described postmodernity as recurrent or nascent modernity. But postmodernity, inasmuch as it is Nietzschean, is anti-rational rather than a new way of thinking. I've been in the grip of the historian of philosophy Donald Palmer's remark that if you were to point out to Nietzsche the rather blatant logical contradictions in his thought Nietzsche's would not be that he was trying to establish a new mode of thought but rather that he was trying to subvert rational thought altogether. Put another way, Nietzsche was endeavoring to replacing man the knower with man the acts without reflection--thus the lionization of Genghis Khan. But, of course, the Enlightenment loved to refer to itself as the age of reason or rationality(as a way of contrasting it to the allegedly anti-rational age of faith that had preceded it). In what sense, then, is Nietzsche an extension of modernity rather than an opponent of it? And, to be sure, Nietzsche thought he was an opponent of modernity--thought he was advocating, more or less, a return to ancient paganism. Whether or not Nietzsche realizes it, Nietzsche is committed to the metaphysics of modernity. You might say that in Nietzsche the ontology of modernity takes precedence to the epistemology of modernity. But, of course, the ontology of modernity, as Nietzsche at least implicitly understood, completely subverted the epistemology of modernity. For the dominant ontology of modernity, inasmuch as there is a characteristic ontology that remains distinct from the dominant ontology of medieval period, was/is a thoroughgoing nominalism. And nominalism not only denies formal cause but also final cause. The denial of final causation entails the denial of any notion of proper function. But it is impossible to speak of reason or rationality as a cognitive faculty aimed at the apprehension of truth (or the production of true beliefs in the rational mind) without some concept of proper function. So inasmuch as modernist ontology rules out teleology and proper function, it also rules out rationality. So doing it returns us to Protagorean anti-realism--thus the pagan thrust of Nietzsche's modernist anti-modernism. Postmodernity rightly understood is, I think, the distinctly modern subversion of modernity--which is another way of saying that modernity subverts itself, i.e., it is self-refuting. I would add that it is not just the modern sophists/PoMos who speak of the Enlightenment's fall. I'll respond to that just a bit later.
Well, that's a long response. Thoughts, criticisms, etc.?
Lee Trepanier on Jul 12, 2009
Dear Paul:
As usual, you have given me a lot to chew on! I'll address some majors points and then some minor ones (I don't expect you to account for the minor ones - we can save them for another post in the future).
1. Your account of the Enlightenment seems to emphasize the Anglo-American tradition, e.g., Locke, Hume, Smith, the American Founders, and certain aspects of Germanic philosophy (Kant in particular) with an emphasis on reason. But isn't there also an "anti-irrational" strand in the Enlightenment with thinkers like Rousseau and Schopenhauer and the poets and artists of the "romantic" tradition? Certainly both strands of the Enlightenment were anti-religious but I don't think it is nearly as monolithic as you seem to present it (or perhaps I have misunderstood you on this point). It always seemed to me that there were several "enlightenments" that were united in what they were opposed to as to what they had in common. Jonathan Israel implicitly makes this point in his two books on the Enlightenment, "Enlightenment Contested" and "Radical Enlightenment."
2. Although I am sympathetic to a return to a Christian or religious-based study of reality (whether Thomist, Augustine, etc.), such a science seems to confront two problems today:
2a) such a science assumes the existence of divinity. But how we can account for such a given? I don't want to push the conversation into esoteric epistemological questions, but it seems that religious believers will claim the divine exist and feel no need to account for it as a given. The position, "if you don't believe God exists, then there is no point to conversing," seems to be a common one among religious academics. Some of this is understandable, given a culture that is hostile to religion. However, I do think some account (not proof, mind you) of the given of divinity needs to be address in the methodology of the philosopher, political scientist, etc.
2b) a science based on Thomist or Augustine concepts seem outdated, i.e., they no longer correspond to the concrete reality of today. Now granted the principles underlying these philosophies may still be relevant and applicable, but the language, methods, and concepts are not. Perhaps some type of "updating" of these ideas are required to make them presentable in today's context.
As far as the minor points:
1. I'm familiar with the criticism of Voegelin's account of the Incarnation. However, I think his account can be consistent with orthodox Christianity (which is what, by the way? The Nicene Creed? The Orthodox Church?), if one understands how his methodology works.
2. Does the Straussian perspective preclude religion from its study of reality? My understanding was that religion was required for reason to operate.
Paul DeHart on Jul 28, 2009
I hope Lee will forgive my long hiatus in responding to his comments. I had a situation with buyers of our house in Tennessee defaulting on the contract. It's been quite a mess.
In reply to the first point, I didn't mean to imply that their is only one strand in the Enlightenment. I meant mostly to go after the common story that Enlightenment tells or told about itself. I of course think the Enlightenment's self-narrative to have been a false one at just about every level--including describing itself as one thing rather than something with multiple and sometimes, at least seemingly, irreconcilable strands. But setting that aside, I think we ought to take note of a few facts. First, almost every major thinker in modernity who represented a break with medieval and classical thought redefined key terms like "reason" (or "rationality") and "nature." It is true that some thinkers (Leibniz comes to mind) subscribed to older notions of reason and rationality. But inasmuch as they did so, to that extent they were not distinctively modern or Enlightenment thinkers. Consequently, the Anglo thinkers you mention (and we might add Hobbes) did not think of reason in anything like the classical or medieval way. For Hobbes and for Hume reason served a purely instrumental function--Hume most famously said that reason is and ought always be the slave of the passions. This is only a slightly more eloquent way of making the same point Hobbes did prior to Hume. Framing reason in instrumental terms was common to both rationalists and early romantics. Of course, there are some notable exceptions. Locke thinks that reason is a faculty for apprehending truth as such. And yet Locke's nominalism and empiricism may push him towards an instrumentalist account of reason nevertheless. This seems to be the way his account of ethical reasoning develops in light of some unpublished, later fragments. As to Rousseau, well, I think Rousseau very difficult to nail down on questions of reason. What I do believe is this (and this is my second point in response to question 1): Rationalists and Romantics operated within a shared framework, that posed to them a dichotomy that would have been entirely foreign to the classical mind. So even purported opponents within modernity frequently operate within a shared framework--a framework they frequently do not share with medieval or ancient thinkers. Again, there are exceptions. And that is my third point--I think we should think of the Enlightenment not as monolithic enterprise but as the gradual emergence of a central tendency (where this tendency is best described as a framework surrounding certain problems). Consequently, while the Enlightenment is going on, classical modes of thinking are still dominant with some. And there are some who mix classical and modern ways of thinking. But eventually we see the dominance of certain defining features--especially as exhibited in the 19th century--materialism, naturalism, nominalism, determinism, utilitarianism, etc. Again, there are exceptions. But if we see the Enlightenment way of thinking as a central tendency or a dominant way of thinking, then the exceptions don't disprove the rule. This brings me to my last reply to the first question. Suppose that there is no one Enlightenment. I am, after all, sympathetic to that argument (and would not have meant to convey antipathy towards it). Suppose also that there are multiple and irreconcilable strands. I would like to maintain the strong position that irreparable damage has been done not only to the common ground between these strands (and I think there is common ground) but also to their distinctive points such that even if they had no common ground, the enlightenments all lie destroyed on the ground. Take theology, for instance. Other than the intellectually soft Jesus Seminar, are there any enlightenment theologians of any sort left? Bultmann is long buried now . . .
To the second question . . . I don't think a return to a Christian or religious based science or a science open to transcendence need begin with an assumption of the God's existence. Although, let me quickly add that I think it may so begin. It need not so begun because God's existence admits of rational discussion and even proof. That is, I subscribe to the project of natural theology. One interesting component of the revival of philosophy of religion is the return of theistic proofs. Plantinga has given us a valid version of the ontological argument. Rob Koons and Bill Craig have given outstanding versions of the cosmological argument. Collins and others have produced compelling versions of the teleological argument. If we don't accept modernity's requirements for what counts as a proof and for what counts as knowledge, then there are compelling proofs of God's existence. Let me go one further. There are compelling arguments (offered by serious philosophers, historians, and theologians) for the resurrection of Christ (see N. T. Wright's The Resurrection of the Son of God and William Lane Craig's Reasonable Faith and A. N. Sherwin-Whites work on Roman law and society in the New Testament). Reason could not predict the resurrection. But it can examine the data of history to verify it. I submit that there is more reason to accept the resurrection of Christ as a historical fact than to accept that Julius Ceaser crossed the Rubicon. The late eminent, Oxford Roman historian Sherwin-White certainly thought so. But let's set aside natural theology and the rational verification of resurrection of the Messiah. These things can be accepted as properly basic. The science that wishes to define science such that it cannot assume God's existence or the tenets of Christian faith must demonstrate two things--and demonstrate them to a certainty--that belief in God's existence or in the dogmas of faith are not properly basic and that they cannot be rationally demonstrated. But no one has ever shown that these things cannot be rationally proven. And no one has shown that they are not properly basic.
I do think charity requires dialogue with those with whom I disagree insofar as they are willing to dialogue. The problem has not been the unwillingness of persons of faith to converse. The problem has been the refusal of secularists to engage religious belief as a live option. But setting that aside, I'm suggesting that the grounds for dialogue exist just because natural theology is possible. Of course, we could create something broader--a science simply open to the transcendent and to the truth of Christian faith. In that case, nothing is assumed at the outset about God's existence. We don't assume it. We assume it's possible that God exists and that it's possible that Christ rose from the dead. We don't begin by assuming that God doesn't exist or isn't relevant or that miracles such as the resurrection are impossible. As philosopher William Alston points out (and Wolterstorff with him) there's no reason for science of any kind to proceed on naturalist, materialistic, or atheistic assumptions or on the assumption that miracles do not or cannot happen.
In response to 2(b), let me only suggest that I wasn't suggesting a rote subscription to Thomism or Augustinianism (or Augustinian-Thomism). It's perfectly compatible with my argument that some updating needs to occur. But I think a question persists. Why are these concepts outdated? How is it that they no longer correspond to reality? Wherein are they wrong? That they are outdated is often asserted. I confess that I have yet to see a demonstration. Take the matter of teleology--in Uncovering the Constitution's Moral Design, I argue that St. Thomas is closer to the truth of the matter than modernity and that modernity's anti-teleological bent is undermined by contemporary physics and contemporary epistemology. Let me put this another way, the claim that Augustine and Thomas are outdated results, as I see it, from our modernist prejudices rather than from reality per se. Modernity dismissed final and formal cause, for instance. But it did so more by assertion than by demonstration. If the postmoderns failed, as Tom Pangle says, to refute the moderns, they but followed the example of the moderns in this who dismissed rather than refuted that which preceded their work.
I wrote this more rapidly than I would have liked. But perhaps there's something in here worth responding to?
Lee Trepanier on Jul 28, 2009
No problem about the delayed reply. I just hope you were able to sort out the mess up there in Tennessee.
Again, I found your reply very thoughtful and I generally agree with most of what you have written. I grant you that that Enlightened thinkers operate within a different paradigm when compared to classical and medieval thinkers; however, why should we disregard this paradigm? Certainly there are aspects of the Enlightenment that I imagine most of us would find admirable, such as religious toleration, which in some sense can only emerge from a certain conception of reason.
But before we proceed any further, perhaps it would be helpful, at least for me, what is the common ground that Enlightenment thinkers share in spite of differences? Is simply a banishment or relegation of theology from their thought; or is something else? It is true that Enlightenment thinkers do relegate a certain type of Christianity but don’t they still retain a place for religion, albeit differently conceived, in the political realm while, at the same, create a type of space for religious toleration? Isn’t such an arrangement more desirable than one would find living under the Taliban?
In a certain sense, the concerns that I have raised are the ones that secularists who are open-minded might want to ask a religious believer. The recent slew of secularist works that mock and deny God is the types that refusal to consider religion as a live option, as you have previously stated. However, I don’t think it’s accurate to say that problem resides entirely on secularists: there are plenty of religious believers who are dogmatic and suspicious of any reasonable dialogue about God’s existence and so on. In other words, I think both sides are partially to blame to this impasse (although not here on this site).